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ABSTRACT
In his essay “The Integration of the Ethic of the Respectful Use of 
Animals into the Law,” David Favre begins to articulate a new frame-
work for understanding the legal status of nonhuman animals. The 
present essay supports the broad contours of Favre’s framework, but 
raises challenges for some of the framework’s elements. The first half 
questions Favre’s claim that possession of DNA and the capacity for 
life underlie the need for a more robust conception of animal legal 
standing. The second half questions both Favre’s prior proposal that 
animals be deemed persons under law and his pragmatic suggestion 
that judges and scholars refrain from specific speculations about the 
moral status of animals.
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In “The Integration of the Ethic of the Respectful Use of 
Animals into the Law,” David Favre begins to articulate a 
new framework for thinking about the moral and legal status 
of nonhuman animals, which he calls the “respectful use” of 
animals. This notion of respectful use indeed appears promis-
ing; certainly it appears more promising, as Favre claims, than 
approaches which are concerned only with economic consider-
ations or with respect for cultural practices. Favre’s framework 
comports well with existing law but also provides resources 
to reform law where it is inadequate. It helps explain why ap-
propriate treatment of animals permits ownership of animals 
and some uses of animal labor. The broad contours of Favre’s 
sketch of how this ethic of respectful use is to be realized out-
side the law are also sensible, as are most of his more specific 
claims about how animals should be treated. As he plausibly 
argues, dogfighting is incompatible with respectful use and 
should be not be legally permitted, and the same is likely true 
of the declawing of cats.
That said, there are serious difficulties with Favre’s proposed 
grounding for the framework of respectful use. First there is his 
tracing of human and animal moral standing to the fact that 
they have DNA and are capable of self-replication, which—so 
far from Favre’s characterization as “not a matter of philosophy 
or debate”—is highly implausible. A machine might self-repli-
cate, for example, without meriting our concern as such; and 
many viruses have DNA, yet it is far from clear that they have 
moral standing for that reason. More importantly, it borders on 
the grotesque to understand the moral status of humans and ani-
mals as derived from their status as “DNA packages.” The rela-
tion between the interests of humans and animals and the con-
ditions under which they or their genes successfully replicate 
is complicated and obscure. But it is clear that the conditions 
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under which human and animal interests are best advanced can 
come apart from the conditions under which they or their genes 
best replicate, and where this is true it is surely a mistake to 
think the latter should dominate our concern. Examples to il-
lustrate this point abound, but perhaps most dramatic is the fact 
of natural death, which is typically contrary to the interests of 
animals even where it conduces to replication of their DNA. 
(Even Richard Dawkins, I think, would allow that much.) And 
of course it bears mention also that in evolutionary theory there 
is wide disagreement concerning the relative significance of 
gene selection, as opposed to organism selection and group se-
lection, as a force shaping humans and other animals.
But even if it is misguided to trace human and animal legal 
and moral standing to a capacity for self-replication or to the 
possession of DNA, Favre’s hypothesis that life is the crite-
rion of moral standing cannot be so quickly dispensed with.1 
(It is worth noting, however, that moving from gene replica-
tion to life as the source of moral status departs significantly 
from Favre’s pragmatic and anti-theoretical motivations. Life 
is a capacity animals share with humans, much like its main 
theoretical competitors for the source of animal moral status: 
consciousness or sentience, desire or preference, and proto-
rationality.2) It is a tricky matter to determine whether plants 
1 For some sophisticated defenses of this position, see Philippa Foot (2001), 
Richard Kraut (2007), and Michael Thompson (2008). I focus my discussion 
of life or possession of DNA as a putative criterion of moral standing on the 
problematic case of plants, but there are of course other problematic cases, 
such as early fetuses and intelligent extraterrestrial beings.
2 For defenses of animal moral status as derived from the value of rationality, 
albeit in two very different ways, see Allen Wood (1998) and Christine Kors-
gaard (2004). Wood and Korsgaard exemplify a recently renewed interest 
in the moral status of animals by Kantian moral theorists. Immanuel Kant’s 
famous injunction never to use people as a mere means is itself a call for 
respectful use; see Kant (1785, 38).
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merit our concern as such. It is certainly true that plants have 
interests, in the sense that there are things which enhance or de-
tract from their flourishing. It is not so clearly correct, however, 
that plants have interests in virtue of being alive. We speak in 
an unstrained fashion of the flourishing of glaciers, hurricanes, 
and other functionally organized nonliving natural entities. We 
speak in a similarly unstrained way of things going well or 
poorly for functionally organized artifacts like cars. These may 
be merely metaphorical uses of “interests” and “flourishing,” 
but perhaps not, since we systematically use these terms in de-
scribing functionally organized things. When we apply these 
terms to things which are not functionally organized, such as 
heaps of sand, the use is more clearly metaphorical.
That it is not implausible to think of glaciers and cars as hav-
ing interests points toward a second and more important com-
plication for the hypothesis that life is the criterion of moral 
standing, namely that having interests and having moral stand-
ing are not clearly coextensive properties. When a thing has in-
terests it makes senses to speak non-metaphorically of its well-
being or flourishing; but when a thing has moral standing this 
entails more strongly that we have reasons (and obligations) to 
concern ourselves with its well-being or flourishing. Thus there 
is conceptual space for things which have interests but whose 
interests fail to generate reasons and obligations, and we must 
consider the possibility that plants fall into this category. One 
reason for thinking they do is that any reasons for attending to 
plant flourishing for the sake of plants themselves must be ex-
ceedingly weak, on pain of absurd implications. Plant interests 
must be systematically subordinated to the interests of humans 
and animals, for it is typically permissible and often rational 
to use and destroy plants for food, clothing, and shelter. One 
reason it is so difficult to discern whether there are reasons to 
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attend to the flourishing of plants as such is that there is always 
stronger reason to attend to plant flourishing: namely that this 
flourishing may contribute to the flourishing of a human or ani-
mal. (Note also that it is difficult to make sense of the notion 
of cruelty to plants.) These considerations militate toward the 
view that conscious awareness, not life, is the capacity which 
entitles animals to our concern.
Favre is right to worry that tracing animal moral standing 
to the capacity of consciousness risks fetishizing pleasure and 
pain in an account of animal flourishing. The best way to con-
front this worry is not to abandon consciousness as the criterion 
of moral standing, however, but rather to explain how this cri-
terion is compatible with an understanding of animal flourish-
ing as involving more than the mere intensity, duration, and 
valence of their experiential states.3
These concerns about positing life as the criterion of moral 
standing need not threaten Favre’s subsequent claims about the 
integration into the law of the ethic of respectful use of animals, 
however, for these claims do not depend on that criterion; in-
deed they appear not even to make use of it. That is: if we sub-
stitute the view that it is in virtue of having conscious aware-
ness that animals merit our concern for Favre’s view that life 
is the relevant criterion, this need not change any of his more 
specific claims about legal and moral obligations concerning 
animals. While the general spirit of Favre’s proposals is appeal-
ing, in the remainder of this essay I articulate some complica-
tions for these proposals.
Consider first the proposal, present in a previous draft of Fa-
vre’s essay, that animals be deemed persons under the law. This 
proposal appears worthy of endorsement, insofar as it is needed 
3 For more on this point see Garthoff (2011).
Jon Garthoff
191
© Between the Species, 2013
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 16, Issue 1
to establish that animals are entitled to broader legal protec-
tion. But as Favre would no doubt agree, it would be absurd to 
suggest animals are liable under law or have responsibilities 
for upholding the law. Considering the legal status of animals 
thus exposes that the rights and responsibilities associated with 
legal personhood must be decomposed into constituent parts. 
More specifically it suggests that a legal system should distin-
guish those with rights or entitlements under the system from 
those with obligations or responsibilities under the system; and 
“personhood” seems a term well-suited to the latter, but not to 
the former, role. Thus it may be better to propose a new legal 
category, distinct from personhood, and include animals in this 
other category. “Animalhood” is perhaps better than it initially 
appears, as a term for picking out the things with this status; 
but whatever term is used, it must be made clear that it is a 
morally motivated category, tracking conscious awareness, and 
not a biological category, much less a phylogenetic category. 
This suggestion comes not so much in opposition to Favre’s 
proposal that animals be deemed legal persons but as a refor-
mulation of it.
Note that such a legal category has important applications 
apart from animals. Fetuses, infants, and the very seriously 
mentally disabled ought to enjoy legal standing of some kind, 
but it is not clear it makes sense to treat them as persons with 
obligations and responsibilities under law. The separation of 
those with entitlements under law from those with obligations 
under law also may help to illuminate the brouhaha in the wake 
of the recent Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
decision (2009).  Corporations are agents, and they should have 
legal personhood so they can be held accountable under the 
law for how they exercise their agency: corporations should 
be liable to civil lawsuits, and should perhaps be criminally li-
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able as well. This may sound odd, since the principal function 
is to limit shareholder liability, mainly by guaranteeing that no 
corporate action can cost an individual more than she has in-
vested in the corporation. Corporate personhood nevertheless 
makes corporations legally liable in ways they would not oth-
erwise be. A corporation may be legally required to pay dam-
ages greater than any individual helping compose it can afford, 
for example, and it is legally possible to find that a corporation 
acted negligently without finding that any individual helping 
compose it acted negligently.
Notwithstanding these considerations favoring corporate le-
gal personhood, corporations are not conscious, and so need 
have no legal entitlements apart from those of conscious indi-
viduals. It may be best, as a way to respect individual entitle-
ments, to accord corporations certain legal rights; the right to 
enter into and enforce contracts is a paradigm example. But 
corporations should have no standing as such. Whatever rights 
and entitlements they have must derive from those of individu-
als, and their rights should not be granted when doing so is ad-
verse to respect for humans and animals, as seems likely in the 
case of a putative corporate right to make political campaign 
contributions. Note that if these observations are correct, then 
the best way to express dissatisfaction with the judgment in 
Citizens United may not be to take issue with corporate person-
hood. This is only a preliminary word on a complicated subject, 
of course, but it appears promising to pursue.
Consider finally Favre’s suggestion that we refrain from leg-
islating ex ante, or indeed theorizing ex ante, what the respect-
ful use of animals consists in; Favre claims we should instead 
leave this notion largely unspecified. The thought seems to be 
that it is best to fill this notion in with more specific content as 
Jon Garthoff
193
© Between the Species, 2013
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 16, Issue 1
case law develops and cultural mores develop over time. Favre 
appreciates here what H. L. A. Hart called the “open texture” 
of law;4 we should reject an understanding of adjudication as 
consisting in the algorithmic application of precisely formu-
lated antecedent rules, and it is important for legal systems to 
refrain where possible from moral speculation far out of step 
with contemporary enlightened common sense. But there may 
be greater reason for judges and legal scholars to specify what 
unnecessary harm to animals consists in, or to specify what ad-
equate care for animals consists in, than to specify (say) what 
due care when backing a car out of a driveway consists in. 
More specificity may be called for in cases involving animals 
because these cases may be less familiar to most people, espe-
cially in present social conditions where most people live in 
cities and suburbs, and so may require greater extension of our 
natural moral sensibilities. For these reasons it may be best for 
judges and legal scholars to articulate principles more specific 
than unnecessary use or inadequate care in an effort not only 
to encapsulate contemporary enlightened common sense but to 
help shape new moral sensibilities as they emerge. Here again 
this suggestion comes not in opposition to the spirit of Favre’s 
claims but as a distinct approach in the same broad family.
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